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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
SUMMARY 
UNITED STATES v. ROE: CHILD ABUSE 
WARRANTS DEPARTURE FROM 
SENTENCING GUIDELINES IN. 
EXTRAORDINARY CIRCUMSTANCES 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In United States u. Roe, l the Ninth Circuit held psychologi-
cal effects of childhood abuse may permit a downward sentenc-
ing departure in extraordinary circumstances.2 The court found 
the Sentencing Guidelines did not directly address childhood 
abuse.3 However, the Sentencing Commission did contemplate 
the effects of childhood abuse in formulating section 5H1.3 of 
the Sentencing Guidelines.4 Therefore, the court determined 
that a departure from the guidelines on the basis of abuse was 
warranted only in extraordinary circumstances. Ii Based on Roe's· 
extensive history of abuse, the Ninth Circuit found the district 
court clearly erred in not finding her circumstances extraordi-
1. United States v. Roe, 976 F.2d 1216 (9th Cir. 1992) (per Thompson, J.; the other 
panel members were Tang, J., and Ferguson, J.). "B. Roe" is a fictitious name given by 
the court because the disposition called for publication. Originally, the case was filed 
under the full name of the defendant-appellant. 
2. Roe, 976 F.2d at 1218. 
3. [d. at 1217. 
4. [d. at 1218. See infra note 32 and accompanying text. 
5. Roe, 976 F.2d at 1218. 
135 
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nary.6 The court, therefore, remanded the case to the district 
court to exercise its discretion to determine whether Roe's abuse 
warranted a downward sentencing departure from her applicable 
guideline range.7 
II. FACTS . 
Roe suffered repeated savage physical, sexual and emotional 
abuse as a child.8 During her childhood, Roe lived with her 
mother, a drug addict, and her mother's boyfriend, a narcotics 
dealer.9 Roe was savagely beaten with belts, cords and hang-
ers, sometimes daily.Io She was also routinely raped and 
sodomized. ll When Roe resisted, her abuser would strip her na-
ked and beat her into submission.I2 At least once, Roe was 
forced to allow her abuser to urinate in her mouth while she lay 
naked on her basement steps. IS This abuse continued for several 
years. I. At the age of twelve Roe ran away from home and was 
forced into prostitution, where she was again brutally abused. III 
Roe was sentenced to 145 months imprisonment under the 
United States Sentencing Guidelines for one count of bank rob-
bery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a).16 Roe's guideline range 
was between 168-210 months. I? Roe's 145 month sentence in-
6.Id. 
7.Id. 
8. United States v. Roe, 976 F.2d 1216, 1218 (9th Cir. 1992). 
9.Id. 
10. Id. The abuser at this time was the mother's boyfriend. Id. 
11.Id. 
12. Id. 
13.Id. 
14.Id. 
15. Id. After leaving her abusive home, one ('If Roe's acquaintances forced her to 
work as a prostitute in Las Vegas where various pimps, customers and boyfriends contin-
ued to beat her. Id. For the past 15 years, Roe has been a victim of such abuse. Id. 
16. Roe, 976 F.2d at 1217. See also 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) which provides: 
Whoever, by force and violence, or by intimidation, takes, or 
attempts to take, from the person or presence of another any 
property or money or any other thing of value belonging to, or 
in the care, custody, control, management, or possession of, 
any bank ... or Whoever enters or attempts to enter any bank 
... with intent to commit in such bank ... any felony affect-
ing such bank ... and in violation of any statute of the United 
States or any larceny - Shall be fined not more than $5,000 or 
imprisoned not more than twenty years, or both. 
17. Roe, 976 F.2d at 1219. Roe had a criminal history category of VI and an offense 
level of 30. Id. 
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volved a two-level downward departure for coercion under sec-
tion 5K2.12 of the guidelines. IS However, the district court did 
not find Roe's childhood abuse or her unique and unfortunate 
personal history extraordinary for any additional departure. Ie 
Thus, Roe's sentencing range was 140-175 months~20 
Roe appealed her sentence arguing: 1) the district court 
erred in refusing to depart downward from her applicable guide-
line range based on her history of childhood abuse,21 and 2) the 
district court erred in failing to state its reasons for choosing her 
sentence within the guideline range.22 
III. COURT'S ANAL YSIS 
The Ninth Circuit's jurisdiction to hear this case arose 
under 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a)(2)28 and 28 U.S.C. § 1291.2' The court 
first noted a district court's legal determination that the Sen-
tencing Commission considered a particular circumstance in for-
mulating the guidelines is reviewed de novo.211 On the other 
hand, the court stated a district court's factual determination 
that a particular circumstance was not extraordinary is reviewed 
for clear error.26 However, appellate courts do not have jurisdic-
tion to review a district court's discretionary refusal to depart 
from the guideline range.27 
18. [d. See infra note 52 and accompanying text. 
19. Roe, 976 F.2d at 1218. 
20. [d. at 1219. 
21. [d. at 1217. 
22. [d. 
23. United States v. Roe, 976 F.2d 1216, 1217 (9th Cir. 1992). See also 18 U.S.C. § 
3742(a)(2) which provides "[a] defendant may file a notice of appeal in the district court 
for review of an otherwise final sentence if the sentence was imposed as a result of an 
incorrect application of the sentencing guidelines issued by the Sentencing Commission 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 994(a)." 
24. Roe, 976 F.2d at 1217. See also 28 U.S.C. § 1291 which provides "[t]he courts of 
appeals shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the district courts of 
the United States ... except where a direct review may be had in the Supreme Court." 
25. Roe, 976 F.2d at 1217. See also United States v. Lira-Barraza, 941 F.2d 745, 746 
(9th Cir. 1991) (en bane) ("Whether consideration of the circumstances is inconsistent 
with ... the Guidelines is ... a question of law reviewed de novo since it involves 
determining ... the Commission's intent."). 
26. Roe, 976 F.2d at 1217. See also United States v. Morales, 961 F.2d 1428, 1431 
(9th Cir. 1992) ("We review ... for clear error [the district court's] finding that the 
mitigating circumstance does not exist in a particular case."). 
27. Roe, 976 F.2d at 1218. See also Morales, 961 F.2d at 1431. 
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A. DISTRICT COURT'S REFUSAL To DEPART FROM ApPLICABLE 
GUIDELINE RANGE 
In refusing to depart from the sentencing guideline' range, 
the district court in Roe concluded that "because the Sentencing 
Commission considered the effects of childhood abuse in formu-
lating the guidelines, it could depart on that basis only in ex-
traordinary circumstances."28 The Ninth Circuit affirmed this 
ruling but determined the district court c'learly erred in finding 
Roe's history of abuse did not constitute extraordinary, circum-
stances warranting a downward departure.29 
The Ninth Circuit first observed that childhood abuse was 
not specifically outlined in the guidelines.30 However, following 
the lead of other circuits, the court ruled section 5H1.3 encom-
passes the psychological effects of abuse.31 Under section 5H1.3 
"[m]ental and emotional conditions are not ordinarily relevant 
in determining whether a sentence should be outside the guide-
lines."s2 Since the Sentencing Commission contemplated child 
abuse the court concluded only extraordinary circumstances of 
abuse could justify a downward departure.33 
In so concluding, the Ninth Circuit cited the Fifth Circuit 
decision United States v. Vela. S4 In Vela, the defendant argued 
for a downward sentencing departure on her drug conviction due 
to the "corrupting influence of her family history,"311 which in-
28. Roe, 976 F.2d at 1217. See also United States v. Boshell, 952 F.2d 1101, 1107 
(9th Cir. 1991) (court may depart only in "extraordinary circumstances" if a factor was 
considered in formulating the guidelines). 
29. Roe, 976 F.2d at 1217. The district court found Roe's history merely "shocking." 
[d. See also supra notes 8-15 and accompanying text for review of Roe's history of abuse. 
30. Roe, 976 F.2d at 1217. 
31. [d. See also United States v. Desormeaux, 952 F.2d 182, 185 (8th Cir. 1991) 
(section 5H1.3 encompasses the effects of emotional conditions from spousal abuse); 
United States v. Vela, 927 F.2d 197, 199 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 214 
(1991) (section 5H1.3 encompasses the effects of emotional conditions from childhood 
abuse). 
32. United States Sentencing Guidelines § 5H1.3 (1990). Section 5H1.3 has since 
been amended effective November 1, 1991. However, the amendment did not substan-
tively change the text of the section for purposes of this decision. 
33. Roe, 976 F.2d at 1218. 
34. United States v. Vela, 927 F.2d 197 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 214 
(1991). 
35. [d. Vela was sentenced to 151 months imprisonment. [d. Her guideline range 
was 151 to 188 months. [d. . 
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cluded incest and abuse.36 However, the Fifth Circuit affirmed 
the district court's decision not to grant a departure under sec-
tion 5H1.3 because it could do so only in extraordinary 
circumstances.37 
The Ninth Circuit agreed with the reasoning in Vela. 3s It 
also cited studies documenting the psychological manifestations 
incurred by child abuse victims including "profound feelings of 
inadequacy, isolation, confusion, low self-esteem, and guilt."3e 
The court reasoned each of these effects constituted either a 
mental or emotional condition described in section 5H1.3.40 Be-
cause the Sentencing Commission expressly considered the im-
pact of mental and emotional conditions under section 5H1.3, 
the court held "psychological effects of childhood abuse may 
only be considered as a basis for departure in extraordinary 
circumstances. "41 
According to the Ninth Circuit, the medically verified evi-
dence before the district court indicated that Roe's history of 
abuse was indeed exceptiona1.42 Thus, the court concluded the 
"district court clearly erred in holding the tragic circumstances 
36. Id. Vela suffered sexual abuse from her stepfather. Id. 
37. Id. The Fifth Circuit stated: 
A defendant's family history of incest or related treatment 
which causes defendant to incur a mental or emotional condi-
tion that affects criminal conduct, may be a ground for depar-
ture in extraordinary cases. It is clear that the Sentencing 
Commission, while leaving open the possibility that the cir-
cumstances of defendant's mental or emotional condition may 
be so extraordinary that departure from the guidelines is 
proper, did not consider these factors relevant in formulating 
the guidelines. 
Roe, 976 F.2d at 1217-18 (quoting Vela, 927 F.2d at 199). 
38. Roe, 976 F.2d at 1218. 
Id. 
39.Id. 
40.Id. 
41. Id. See also Boshell, 952 F.2d at 1107. 
42. Roe, 976 F.2d at 1218. The Ninth Circuit noted: 
One psychologist testified that "it seems to be extreme" and 
"go[es] above and beyond" the type of abuse normally en-
countered. Another stated that "[h]er history is on the more 
severe side. I would say she would fit in the upper spectrum of 
people I have seen in jail. She is not average." A third re-
ported that Roe's abuse was so severe she had become "virtu-
ally a mindless puppet." 
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of Roe's abusive upbringing were not extraordinary.""s Accord-
ingly, the Ninth Circuit remanded the case for the district court 
to "exercise its discretion in determining whether the excep-
tional nature of Roe's history of abuse warrants a departure 
from her applicable guideline range. """ 
The Ninth Circuit also suggested the district court should 
consider whether Roe's history warranted departure due to 
youthful lack of guidance under the recent decision United 
States v. Floyd. "II The court reiterated the horrific abuse Roe 
experienced and stressed that Roe's childhood "lacked any sem-
blance of a stable family environment, and it is doubtful she re-
ceived any meaningful guidance from her drug-addicted mother 
or her mother's abusive boyfriend.""s For these reasons, the 
Ninth Circuit suggested Roe may be entitled to a departure 
under Floyd."7 
B. REASONS FOR CHOOSING ROE'S SENTENCE 
Under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c)(1)"8 a district court must "state 
its reasons for choosing a sentence within the applicable guide-
line range if that range exceeds 24 months.""9 Roe contended 
her sentence should have been vacated because the district court 
43. Roe, 976 F.2d at 1218. 
44. [d. The court noted "[t)his decision is not in conflict with our prior decision in 
United States u. Morales, 961 F.2d 1428, 1430 (9th Cir. 1990), because we are not re-
viewing the district court's discretionary decision not to depart downward from the 
Guidelines. Instead, we are reviewing a factual finding that the district court believed 
prevented it from exercising its discretion." [d. at 1218 n.!. 
45. United States v. Floyd, 945 F.2d 1096 (9th Cir. 1991). In Floyd, the defendant's 
lack of guidance and education, abandonment by parents and imprisonment at age 17 
constituted elements of mitigating circumstances which were considered to be fairly 
characterized as "youthful lack of guidance." [d. at 1099. 
46. Roe, 976 F.2d at 1218. Roe's mother not only neglected her, but on several occa-
sions, forced Roe to transport drugs across state lines for her mother's use. [d. 
47. [d. 
48. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c)(1) provides "[t)he court, at the time of sentencing, shall 
state in open court the reasons for its imposition of the particular sentence, and, if the 
sentence is of the kind, and within the range described in subsection (a)(4), the reason 
for imposing a sentence on a particular point within the range." 
49. Roe, 976 F.2d at 1219. See also United States v. Upshaw, 918 F.2d 789, 792 (9th 
Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1335 (1991) ("statement must include a discussion of 
the factors used to choose a particular sentence within the sentencing range ... in-
clud[ing) individual considerations of background, character, and conduct, as well as the 
systematic goals of deterrence, rehabilitation, and consistency in sentencing"). 
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failed to state its reasons for sentencing her to 145 months in 
prison.1IO However, Roe's 145 month prison sentence consisted of 
a two-level downward departure from her 168-210 month guide-
line range.11l Roe's two-level downward departure was based on 
coercion under section 5K2.12 of the guidelines.Ci2 Therefore, the 
Ninth Circuit ruled section 3553(c)(1) did not apply in Roe's sit-
uation because her sentence fell outside her applicable guideline 
range.Ci3 
However, since the district court departed from Roe's appli-
cable guideline range, it was required to specify its reason for 
such a departure under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c)(2).Ci4 The district 
court found Roe was coerced by a male companion who 
threatened and struck her before the robbery.CiCi However, de-
spite this evidence, the court found Roe's conduct "not entirely 
reasonable."Ci6 Therefore, the district court found Roe was enti-
50. Roe, 976 F.2d at 1219. 
51. Id. 
52. [d. See also United States Sentencing Guidelines § 5K2.12 which provides: 
If the defendant committed the offense because of serious co-
ercion, blackmail or duress, under circumstances not amount-
ing to a complete defense, the court may decrease the sentence 
below the applicable guideline range. The extent of the de-
crease ordinarily should depend on the reasonableness of the 
defendant's actions and on the extent to which the conduct 
would have been less harmful under the circumstances as the 
defendant believed them to be. Ordinarily coercion will be suf-
ficiently serious to warrant departure only when it involves a 
threat of physical injury, substantial damage to property or 
similar injury resulting from the unlawful action of a third 
party or from a natural emergency. The commission consid- , 
ered the relevance of economic hardship and determined that 
personal financial difficulties and economic pressures upon a 
trade business do not warrant a decrease in sentence. 
53. Roe, 976 F.2d at 1219. Ct. United States v. Martinez-Gonzalez, 962 F.2d 874, 878 
(9th Cir. 1992) ("a sentence involving an upward departure is not imposed within the 
applicable Guidelines range"). 
54. Roe, 976 F.2d at 1219. See also 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c)(2) which provides "the court, 
at the time of sentencing, shall state in open court the reasons for its imposition of the 
particuiar sentence, and, if the sentence is not of the kind, or is outside the range de-
scribed in subsection (a)(4) , the specific reason for imposition of a sentence different 
from that described." 
55. Roe, 976 F.2d at 1219. 
56. [d. Reasonableness of defendant's conduct is relevant in determining departure 
from guidelines. United States Sentencing Guidelines § 5K2.12. See supra note 52 for 
full text of section 5K2.12. The court found Roe's behavior unreasonable because she 
entered the car' with this person. Roe, 976 F.2d at 1219. 
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tIed to a two-level departure. 57 Because the district court ana-
lyzed the facts regarding coercion and the reasonableness of 
Roe's conduct, the Ninth Circuit found the district court's 
downward departure adequately explained on the record per 
section 3553(c)(2).58 
C. COURT'S CONCLUSION 
The Ninth Circuit found the district court did not exercise 
its discretion to make a downward departure because it did not 
find Roe's childhood abuse and neglect extraordinary. 59 There-
fore, the Ninth Circuit vacated Roe's sentence and remanded to 
the district court to exercise its discretion.so However, the Ninth 
Circuit rejected Roe's second contention that the district court 
failed to state its reasons for choosing her sentence under 18 
U.S.C. § 3553(c).Sl 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The Ninth Circuit in United States v. Roe,S2 addressed 
whether convicted defendants may receive a downward depar-
ture under the Sentencing Guidelines due to childhood abuse.ss 
The court found child abuse was not directly contemplated 
under the guidelines, but that the Sentencing Commission con-
templated defendant's mental and emotional state from abuse 
under section 5H1.3.s4 Therefore, the court determined child 
abuse would justify a departure from the applicable guideline 
range only in extraordinary circumstances.s5 The court rightfully 
found extraordinary circumstances present in Roe's case. 
57. Roe, 976 F.2d at 1219. 
58. Id. See also note 54 and accompanying text. 
59. Roe, 976 F.2d at 1217. 
60.Id. 
61. Id. at 1219. 
Sara Vukson Winter* 
62. United States v. Roe, 976 F.2d 1216 (9th Cir. 1992). 
63.Id. 
64. Id. at 1217-18. 
65.Id. 
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